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When the Fordhan Environmental Law Review began 20 years
ago, California was an environmental leader. It still is. But the nature
of its leadership in the last decade is a story in and of itself, one of
the most significant domestic environmental stories since the
Review 's inception. California has enacted what is arguably the
world's most ambitious policy to tackle greenhouse gas emissions. Its
program to achieve this - and some musings on the reasons for its
leadership - is the focus of this essay.
California's climate policy seems categorically different from its
past environmental leadership. The state is not simply regulating a
single product (say, automobiles) or a particular sector of the
economy (say, electric utilities). Nor is it tackling a problem of
particular importance to the state (say, air pollution). Instead, the
effort to regulate climate change is truly an economy-wide one. And
the state is engaging in this extensive regulatory activity even though
reducing greenhouse gas emissions will produce very few
environmental benefits for California given the global nature of the
problem of climate change.
* Ann E. Carlson is the Shirley Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law at the
UCLA School of Law and the co-Faculty Director of the Emmett Center on
Climate Change and the Environment. I thank William Boyd and Alice Kaswan as
well as faculty participants in workshops at Emory and Minnesota Law Schools for
extremely helpful comments. I also thank state Senator Fran Pavley and California
Air Resources Board Chairwoman Mary Nichols for their candor and insights
about CARB and for their extraordinary leadership on California climate policy.
1. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal
Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1516-20
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Scholars have long puzzled over why some states emerge as
environmental leaders. Explanations range from the political benefits
such leadership can produce for political actors,2 to perceived
economic benefits,' to the political preferences of a state's voters.
All of these seem to explain at least a portion of California's climate
change leadership.
In a separate article I have suggested that still another part of the
causal story is that federal law has created state environental
leaders through a complex dynamic I call iterative federalism - the
idea here is that federal law has singled out a state, or group of states,
to engage in regulatory experimentation. This experimentation has
then led to federal adoption of the policies that have emerged from
the experiment, which has in turn led to state innovation, and so
forth. The two notable examples of iterative federalism are both
contained in the Clean Air Act: California's designation as the
regulatory leader on automobile emissions and the Northeastern
states' authority to regulate ozone pollution on a regional basis.
These designations have, I argue, led to state and regional leadership
on climate change.
Here I want to concentrate on a related - but distinct - part of the
story about climate change leadership in California. The story is less
about why California has taken the lead (voter preferences, for
example, are obviously relevant), though I think my story is relevant
to causality. My focus instead is on how California has been able to
do so - not just to pass ambitious legislation but to implement,
largely on time, a regulatory program of vast and complex scope. My
story here is a relatively simple but, I suggest, largely overlooked
one: prior to enacting ambitious climate change legislation, the state
had created regulatory institutions of extraordinary sophistication and
(2007); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local
Climate Change Initiatives., 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 119, 120-22 (2008).
2. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 1, at 1519.
3. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 1. at 132: Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman
& Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change
Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 32-42 (2005).
4. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice.Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 636-41 (2001).
5. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1097, 1099-1100 (2008).
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capacity and real political agility. Without such regulatory capacity,
the state simply could not lead as ably or quickly as it has.
My claim, then, has relevance to the larger debate about federalism
and environmental leadership. In addition to already proffered
theories about why some states engage in aggressive environental
regulatory activity, I suggest that a state's regulatory capacity is an
important part of the story. Regulatory capacity does not, of course,
exist in a vacuum. States lead in a particular environmental area and
develop regulatory expertise necessary to implement their
environmental policies. But that regulatory expertise can, in turn,
lead to further environmental leadership, which can in turn solidify
and enhance regulatory expertise. Regulatory expertise and
environmental leadership, in other words, are mutually reinforcing in
ways we have previously overlooked.
Of course an important factor in a state using its regulatory
capacity to engage in additional environental policy making is
earlier regulatory success. A state is less likely to engage in
ambitious new environmental regulation unless its previous efforts
have succeeded, both politically and in measurable environental
outcome. Such past regulatory success - particularly in air pollution
regulation - helps explain why California has been willing to lead on
climate change regulation. In repeatedly achieving demonstrable
regulatory success by reducing automobile emissions, California's
Air Resources Board has won the confidence of both the public and
of elected officials. Federal law has played an important role here: by
singling out the state to lead on mobile source emissions under the
Clean Air Act, the federal government has encouraged the
development of significant regulatory expertise. 6 That regulatory
expertise has, in turn, led to the state legislature relying on the Air
Resources Board to develop ambitious climate policy.
But there is also more to the story. While federal law granted
California special status, it did not require the state to actually use
that status, nor did the federal government direct California in how to
use its leadership role. In the 40 years of experience under the Act,
California's air board has developed into one of the most
sophisticated and well-regarded environmental agencies in the world.
The agency has managed to remain popular through most of its
6. See Carlson, supra note 5., at 1138.
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decades of existence. Why and how, then, has the agency managed to
develop such independence and expertise?
I briefly suggest several possible explanations in this article. These
explanations are meant to stimulate a broader conversation about
what creates effective bureaucratic administration and about what
makes certain states environmental leaders in a broader federal
system.7 For example, the structure of the Air Resources Board
(CARB) - which is also the agency implementing California's
climate change legislation - has been important to the state's
regulatory successes. CARB is regulated by an independent board
comprised of political appointees that come from a variety of pre-
designated professional backgrounds.8 This structure appears both to
insulate the board from intense political partisanship and agency
capture while at the same time providing it with politically
accountable leadership. The agency is also well-funded, with a
dedicated revenue stream financed by regulated parties. This funding
mechanism has largely, though not completely, insulated the agency
from California's fiscal woes and has provided the agency with the
budget necessary to fund a large and professional staff.9 And the
agency has had continued and visible success in its primary mission -
reducing air pollution - that has made it trusted and popular among
legislators. Finally, the agency has avoided being captured by the
principal industry it regulates, the auto industry. This avoidance of
agency capture has occurred for several reasons, including that
California is not home to an indigenous auto industry; an independent
7. See generally David A. Dana, One Green America: Continuities and
Discontinuities in Environmental Federalism in the United States, 24 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (2013) (discussing the large role California has played
and the regulatory independence the state has exerted in air pollution and climate
change regulation).
8. About the Selection of Our Board, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/board/about.htm (last visited March 17, 2013).
9. For background about the fees that fund CARB, see Environmental
Protection: 3900 Air Resources Board, GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 2013-14: PROPOSED
BUDGET DETAIL (last visited Feb. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/StateAgencyBudgets/3890/3900/department.htinl'addi
nfo. AB 32 implementation is funded by a fee imposed on greenhouse gas
emitters, the authorization for which was contained in the original legislation. Ca.
Health & Safety Code § 38597; see also AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee
Regulation, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2009/feereg09/feereg09.htn (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
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emissions technology industry has emerged in response to the state's
regulatory policies; CARB has developed a professional, independent
staff; and the auto industry has repeatedly undermined its own
credibility by making claims about regulatory burden that have
turned out to be exaggerated or untrue. In highlighting these features
of California's regulatory agency, I do not mean to downplay more
conventional explanations for the state's leadership. California's
voters across the political spectrum, for example, are supportive of
strong environmental policies - they recently turned back an
initiative to halt the implementation of the state's climate policies
with conservative, rural counties joining their coastal urban
counterparts in doing so.'0 California's political leaders campaign
openly on pro-en-vironmental platforms; indeed the most notable was
a Republican, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who not only
signed AB 32 into law but consistently championed the legislation."
And some of the state's environmental success may be explained by
sui generis factors like individual leadership: for example by most
accounts the current Chairwoman of the CARB board, Mary Nichols,
has exceptional political and administrative skills that have been a
significant contributor to AB 32's effective implementation. 12M
aim, instead, is to highlight a feature of California governance - its
regulatory competence - that has helped make such leadership
possible and effective.
Before describing the environmental regulatory capacity California
has created, I set forth below the parameters of California's plan to
implement its climate legislation. I focus in particular on one of the
principal components of the plan, a cap-and-trade program to
10. See Todd Woody., California's Conservative Counties Voted Green on Prop
23, GRIST (Nov 5., 2010), available at http:/grist.org/article/2010-11-05-
californias-conservative-counties-voted-green-on-prop-23/.
11. For a description of the role he played in promoting action on climate
change. see Coral Davenport, Arnold Schwarzenegger: Terminator, Body-Builder
and Global Leader on Climate-Change., NATIONAL JOURNAL (Dec. 30, 2012),
available at http://,vww.nationaljoumal.com/energy/arnold-schwarzenegger-
terminator-body-builder-and-global- leader-on-climate-change-20121230.
12. See e.g, Dana Hull, Mercury News Interview: Mary Nichols of the
California Air Resources Board, San Jose Mercury News, (Nov. 11, 2012)
("Nichols... is widely recognized as one of the most knowledgeable and influential
clean and air and climate regulators in the United States.").
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regulate large industrial and energy sources,3 in order to demonstrate
the breadth and sophistication of the regulatory effort. But I first
provide an overview of and background about the central
components of the state's climate plan. I then turn to some of the
distinctive qualities of California's lead regulatory agency on climate
policy, including its funding sources, its political structure, its size,
and its independence in order to provide at least a partial explanation
for the state's climate accomplishments.
I. CALIFORNIA CLIMATE POLICY
A. AB 32
California's first significant legislation addressing climate change
regulation, passed in 2002, ordered CARB to develop greenhouse gas
emissions standards for automobiles.' 4 The state followed the car
standards in late 2006 with a much more sweeping bill, AB 32, the
California Global Warming Solutions Act.' 5 AB 32 required
California to roll back its greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 2020
and largely delegated the determination of how to do so to CARB.
The legislation did include a number of deadlines, along with
guidance to the Board about how to carry out its task, but is
remarkable for its relative brevity: the entire legislation is ten pages
long. By way of comparison, the only comprehensive climate bill to
pass a house of Congress - the American Clean Energy and Security
Act (also known as Waxman-Markey) - was 1,427 pages.16
The ten-page bill delegating broad authority to CARB contained a
rather Herculean task: cut the state's emissions by 20 percent (the
13. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013) (arguing
that environmental law has not effectively dealt with the intersection between
energy and environment).
14. Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 42823, 43018.5 (2012): For an explanation
of AB 1493 and its passage, see Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281,292 (2003).
15. Assembly Bill No. 32, Chapter 488 (2006), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab 0001-
0050/ab 32 bill 20060927 chaptered.pdf.(last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
16. See American Clean Energy and Security Act (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill-hi11-2454, version passed by
the House (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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amount necessary to achieve 1990 levels) with no adjustment for
population or economic growth. California is expected to add more
than 4 million people between 2010 and 2020, according to the
state's Department of Finance (significantly lower than pre-recession
projections but still an increase of 11.5 percent).17 CARB is to
achieve these reductions by 2020 and to have a fully operational
mandatory cap in place by January 1, 2012. The legislation also
required CARB to meet several other important deadlines, including
setting the overall emissions budget to be achieved (set by the Board
in Dec 2007 at 427 million metric tons of CO2e); the preparation and
approval, by January 1, 2009, of a scoping plan setting forth the
measures the state' will take to achieve the emissions budget
(approved in Dec of 2008);8 and the adoption of a mandatory
reporting rule by January, 1, 2008 (approved). 19
B. AB 32 Implementation
The magnitude of CARB's scoping plan to implement the state's
emissions goals is impressive. It includes a Renewable Electricity
Standard of 33% by 2020;20 a Low Carbon Fuel Standard;21 Regional
Transportation Targets for local governments (required by a separate
bill, SB 375);22 vehicle efficiency measures including the use of low
friction oil and solar reflective automotive paint and window
glazing;23 power requirements for ocean-going vehicles while in
17. State Projected to Add 4.3M! people by 2020, CALIFORNIA WATCH (last
visited June 24, 2011), available at http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/state-
projected-add-43m-people-2020-11066.
18. See AB 32 Scoping Plan, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (last visited
March 17, 2013), available at
http://vww.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htin.
19. See AB 32, supra note 14.
20. California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs., CALIFORMNIA
ENERGY COMMISSION (April 21, 2011), http://ww.energy.ca.gov/renewables/.
21. Low Carbon Fuel Standard Program, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD
(last visited Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/lcfs.htin.
22. Sustainable Communities, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (last visited
Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/sb375.htin.
23. Status of Scoping Plan Recommended Measures, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD. available at
http://vww.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/status of scoping plan measures.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013)
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24 25 e e o fi i n y m a u eport: a Million Solar Roofs program: energy efficiency measures
for residential, commercial and industrial sources; 26 and a cap-and-
trade program covering 85% of the state's emissions.27 In addition,
the scoping plan relies on emissions reductions from automobile
standards that are now federal in nature but that began as state
standards dev eloped by CARB. 28 Each of these programs is
independently complex: the Regional Transportation Targets, for
example, require CARB to develop greenhouse gas emissions targets
for each of 18 metropolitan planning organizations around the state.
These MPOs must then prepare plans to demonstrate how they will
meet their targets; CARB must in turn approve the plan or require the
MPO to submit an alternative plan.29 The point here is not to
catalogue the complexity of each independent scoping plan measure,
but rather simply to show how far reaching and complicated CARB's
regulatory efforts are.
C. AB 32 and Cap-and-Trade
The cap-and-trade program is in some sense the centerpiece of
CARB's efforts, covering 85% of the state's emissions. 0 Some of the
emissions reductions required under the cap come from
complementary policies that require sources to reduce emissions in
mandated ways. For example, the 33% Renewable Energy Standard
24. See id. at 4.
25. California's Climate Plan, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, available
at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/facts/scoping plan fs.pdf (last visited Feb. 10. 2013).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 1. Though CARB is the principal regulatory agency implementing AB
32 it does have help from the California Energy Commission and the Public
Utilities Commission, both of which have authority over the Renewable Electricity
Standard program. RPS Program Overview, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMIssION (last modified Feb. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy /Renewables/overview.htm. The Energy
Commission also has authority over energy efficiency programs, including
appliance and building standards. Building Energy Efficiency Program,
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, available at http://www.energyca.gov/title24/.
28. See Climate Change Programs, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
available at http://vww.arb.ca.gov/cc/cc.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
29. Building Energy Efficiency Program, California Energy Commission (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/ (explaining
program).
30. See California's Climate Plan, supra note 25, at 1.
[VOL. XXIV
CALIFORNIA 'S CLIMATE POLICY
will require the state's utilities to shift away from carbon-intensive
fuels to alternative ones, with concomitant greenhouse gas emissions
reductions that will help them meet their emissions reduction
requirements under cap-and-trade. 3 1 But the cap will require covered
entities to make additional reductions and will ensure that the state
meets its overall emissions reduction goals even if the
complementary policies fail to produce their expected reductions.32
The sophistication of the state's cap-and-trade program is worth
highlighting both because the program is so central to the
accomplishment of the state's goals and also to illustrate the
complexity of the regulatory task CARB faces.
As with all cap-and-trade programs, its basic parameters are as
follows: A total amount of allowable pollution is set (the cap). Those
subject to the cap are allocated allowances (in sum equal to the cap)
that allow them to pollute (one ton per allowance, with the total
number of allocated allowances equal to the cap). And emitters may
meet their allocated amount in one of three ways. They may use all of
their allowances. They may cut their pollution to levels below the
amount they've been allocated and trade/sell the excess allowances to
those who need them. Or they may pollute in excess of the amount of
allowances allocated and make up the difference by purchasing
allowances from those emitters who don't need all of theirs.33
California's program covers 600 facilities and began its coverage
in 2012 with electric utilities and large industrial facilities. It will
expand to include fuel distributors in 2015. The cap will decline 2
percent annually until 2015 and 3 percent annually beginning in
31. For a discussion of the relationship between cap-and-trade programs and
complementary policies and an argument that complementary policies may
undermine the market incentives of cap-and-trade, see Ann E. Carlson, Designing
Effective Climate Policy: Complementary Policies and Cap-and-Trade, 49 HARV J.
LEGIS. 207 (2012). For a discussion of the controversy cap-and-trade has
engendered among environmental justice advocates, See Alice Kaswan,
Environmental Justice and Environmental La4, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 149,
158 (2013).
32. For example, a federal district court has enjoined the state from
implementing Low Carbon Fuel Standard, a decision currently on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.
33. For an explanation of cap-and-trade., see Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-
and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change, 8-9 The Brookings
Institution (2007).
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2015.34 The state has decided, for the most part, to distribute
allowances to covered entities for free rather than auctioning them.
The stated rationale is to prevent leakage in the industrial sector of
emissions from California to other jurisdictions and to protect utility
ratepayers who would otherwise see prices nse as utilities include the
cost of purchasing allowances in the rate base.35 The cap-and-trade
program will allow emitters to bank allowances for use in future
years and will allow a three year compliance period in order to allow
for year over year changes in production and output.3
The cap-and-trade program will also allow emitters to use offsets -
emissions reductions from outside the capped sector - to meet a
portion of their compliance obligations (up to 8 percent). CARB has
adopted four offset protocols: Urban Forestry, Livestock Manure,
Ozone Depleting Substances destruction and Forest projects.37
The genesis of these offset protocols comes out of a regulatory
background that also demonstrates the state's interesting regulatory
capacity. Climate Action Reserve (CAR) is a non-profit organization
that began as a sister organization to California's Climate Action
Registry, established by state law in 2001 to begin voluntary
greenhouse gas emissions reporting.3 8 CAR is incorporated as a non-
profit and includes on its board leading state officials, including the
California Secretary for Environmental Protection and the
Governor's Executive Secretary for Legislation, Appointments and
Policy. Additional members include local California officials,
representatives of stakeholder groups like the California Fann
Bureau, Shell Oil, local utilities and the Natural Resources Defense
34. See Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD (last revised Oct. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011 /cap trade overview.pdf.
35. See Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD (last revised Oct. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011 /cap trade overview.pdf.
36. See id.
37. Compliance Offset Program., CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (last
visited Feb. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htn.
38. See About UJ's, CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, available at
http://www.climateactionreserve.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013.).
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Council and international officials from Canada and Mexico.39 Its
funding comes from account holders who register with the Climate
Action Registry.40 CAR's task is to develop stringent offset protocols
through a multi-stakeholder process for use in North American
carbon markets.41
CARB has adopted but modified four of CAR's offset protocols.
Many, but not all, of the changes are technical ones designed to
incorporate the offset protocols into a regulatory system. Some,
however, are more substantive: CARB modified the Urban Forestry
protocol, for example, to disallow greenhouse gas emissions
reductions from building energy use that CAR believes will result
* * *42from an increase in urban tree planting.
In addition to the substantive provisions of its cap-and-trade
program, the state has adopted a sophisticated suite of measures to
maximize the liquidity and transparency of its cap-and-trade market.
These include emissions registries requiring annual reporting of
emissions, the reporting of spot market prices, quarterly auctions, a
requirement that investor-owned utilities sell their allowances and
receive the proceeds, and the establishment of an allowance reserve
that will make a certain number of allowances available at a pre-
established price in the event that prices spike.43
39. See Board of Directors, CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE,
http://www.c limateactionreserve.org/about-us/board-of-directors/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2013).
40. See California Climate Action Registry., CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE,
available at http://www.climateactionreserve.org/about-us/california-climate-
action-registry/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
41. Climate Action Reserve Program Manual, CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE,
http://wxvww.climateactionreserve.org about-us/california-climate-action-registry/
(last visited at Feb. 11, 2013).
42. Compliance Offset Program, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
available at http://vww.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013).
43. For an analysis of the risk of market manipulation that California's cap-and-
trade system could face, see Bowman Cutter, M. Rhead Enion, Ann Carlson, and
Cara Horowitz, Rules of the Game: Examining Market Manipulation, Gaming and
Enforcement in California's Cap-and-Trade Program, EMMETT CENTER ON
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2011); for a description and analysis of
CARB's allowance reserve containment system., see Appendix G, Allowance Price
Containment Reserve Analysis, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, available at
http://vww.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtradel0/capv3appg.pdf (last visited Fed.
11,2013).
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Though one can quarrel with certain of the provisions CARB has
adopted - many observers support the auctioning of allowances
rather than giving them to emitters, for example, the question of
offsets remains a controversial one, and the environmental justice
community in California opposes the general idea of cap-and-trade44
- the agency appears to have used the experience of other cap-and-
trade programs to learn from the mistakes of those programs and to
borrow their best practices. For example the most controversial cap-
and-trade program to date, at least among Californians, is the South
Coast Air Quality Management District's ("SCAQMD") Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market ("RECLAIM") program. RECLAIM
established a cap-and-trade program for utilities and large industrial
facilities to limit NOx and Sox emissions. 5 The program is notable
for being the only cap-and-trade program to date to breach its cap -
when total pollutants emitted exceeded the capped amount allowable
- during the 2001 energy crisis in California. Allowance prices per
ton of pollutant had averaged below $2,000 per ton but in 2001 -
with record temperatures and an energy market reeling from partial
deregulation - demand for energy spiked while out-of-state imports
were, for complicated reasons, constrained. The state's utilities then
increased their reliance on in-state natural gas facilities, which in turn
increased utility emissions of the capped pollutants but utilities
lacked sufficient allowances to meet their allocated amounts under
the program. The fact that RECLAIM did not allow for the banking
of allowances contributed to the shortage of allowances. Allowance
prices spiked to a high of $124,000 in 2000. Rather than cutting
emissions, the utilities breached the cap. In response, SCAQMD
pulled the utilities out of the program. 46
CARB appears to have heeded lessons learned from the RECLAIM
program by building in several mechanisms to avoid unanticipated
allowance price spikes. These including allowing for banking, which
provides flexibility to emitters to meet their allowance allocation
burdens; using a three year compliance period: establishing an
allowance reserve program to provide a set percentage of allowances
44. See Kaswan, supra note 31, at 174.
45. See Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), SOUTH COAST AIR
QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT (last updated Feb. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/reclaim.html.
46. See Cutter et al., supra note 43 at 18, 43-46 (for an extensive analysis of
RECLAIM).
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at a pre-established price in case of a price spike; independent market
monitoring and so forth47 EPA had criticized the RECLAIM
program for, among other things, failing to build in sufficient
flexibility for emitters to meet their allocation obligations and CARB
appears to have followed EPA's recommendations by building in
more flexibility.48 In a recent study of the potential for gaming and
market manipulation in CARB's cap-and-trade program, we
concluded that "CARB's proposed carbon market is much less
vulnerable to market manipulation than the California power market
was in 2000-01."49
The RECLAIM example is but one of several that illustrate the
ways in which CARB has structured its program to avoid mistakes of
other programs and to use their best practices. CARB has taken
measures to improve offset integrity, learning from mistakes made by
the European Union in its European Trading System: improve
transparency in emissions reporting, again learning from the ETS
experience; and improve the regulation of the allowance spot market
based on the experiences of several cap-and-trade programs,
including the Acid Rain Trading Program and the ETS.o
Of course until the cap-and-trade program is up and running and
fully functional it is impossible to know whether it will accomplish
its goals of cutting emissions cost-effectively and in a manner that
allows for a relatively smooth functioning of the market it is creating.
And cap-and-trade programs are controversial for other reasons.
The point here is not to single CARB out for praise for adopting a
cap-and-trade program, but merely to demonstrate that the agency
has approached the task with sophistication and timeliness, and to
date appears to have adopted a well-designed program.
D. AB 32 Accomplishments
The preceding section is meant to show that CARB's
accomplishments in implementing AB 32, to date, demonstrate rather
remarkable regulatory capacity. The agency has in five years put
together an economy-wide plan to cut carbon emissions dramatically
47. Id at 5-7.
48. Id at 18.
49. Id at 45.
50. Id at 15-17.
51. See Kaswan, supra note 31 at 161.
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through an array of sophisticated policy mechanisms that will touch
virtually every sector of the economy. The mechanisms include land
use regulations, a low carbon fuel standard, automobile standards, a
Renewable Electricity standard, a cap-and-trade program and sector-
specific measures aimed at large sources like ocean-going vessels.52
Three other observations are worth making about the five-year
process to implement AB 32. First, CARB has implemented AB 32
on time. Indeed the agency has met virtually all the deadlines
established in the original AB 32 legislation: to adopt mandatory
reporting of emissions by January 1, 2008 (Health & Safety Code
Sec. 38530(a)); to set a statewide emissions limit both for 1990 and
2020 (since the statutory goal is to cut greenhouse gases to 1990
levels by 2020) by January 1, 2008 (H&S Sec 38550); to identify by
June 30, 2007 and adopt implementing regulations by January 1,
2010 for "discrete, early action greenhouse gas emission reduction
measures that can be implemented prior to the" implementation of
the statewide cap (H&S Sec. 38560.5); to prepare a scoping plan
setting out "the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.. .by 2020" (H & S Sec.
38561); to adopt regulations by January 1, 2011 to implement the
measures that will be required to meet total emissions limits, with the
regulations becoming effective January 1, 2012. (H & S Sec
38562).
Though meeting statutory deadlines may seem like an
unremarkable achievement, CARB's actions contrast rather
dramatically with the Environmental Protection Agency, which is
notorious for missing deadlines. Indeed before issuing its
performance standard to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
electric utility steam generating units, the EPA faced a deadline set
52. See John R. Nolon, Shifuing Paradigms Transform Environmental and Land
Use Law: The Emergence of the Law of Sustainable Development, 24 FORDHAM
EiNVTL. L. REV. 242. 243 (2013) (noting that there are new paradigms emerging in
the land use context where environmental issues, such as emissions, can be tackled
at the local level).
53. The cap-and-trade program has been delayed slightly because of a
successful lawsuit holding that CARB did not fully comply with the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The lawsuit required CARB to revise its
Environmental Impact Report in order to consider alternatives to cap-and-trade
more fully. As a result, the cap-and-trade program began as scheduled on January
1, 2012 and included at least two auctions during the 2012 calendar year, but
emitters did not face compliance obligations until January 1, 2013.
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by court order. The parties agreed to extend the deadline but the EPA
failed to meet the second deadline as well.
Equally impressively, CARB has managed to stay on schedule in
implementing AB 32 through two different gubernatorial
administrations, one Republican (Schwarzenegger) and one
Democratic (Brown), and through four different Board Chairs (Dr.
Alan Lloyd, Cindy Tuck, Dr. Robert Sawyer and current chair Mary
Nichols). 4 Again as a point of contrast, it is hard to imagine the EPA
experiencing a change in presidential and secretarial leadership when
the executive branch changes political parties without experiencing
significant upheaval and delay in implementing a major policy
change.5
CARB has also stayed on schedule - with only a minor blip -
despite facing legal challenges. One lawsuit, brought by
environmental justice advocates, alleged both substantive and
procedural deficiencies in the state's program. The state successfully
defended against the substantive challenges, lost the procedural
challenge alleging that it had failed to consider a carbon tax as an
adequate alternative to the cap-and-trade program, but managed
nevertheless to satisfy the procedural requirements and remain on
schedule except for the delay of the first auction of allowances.5 6
Another legal challenge - also from enviromnental groups - alleged
that the state's offset protocols were illegal. It, too, was dismissed.
A third, challenging the state's Low Carbon Fuel Standard as
unconstitutionally discriminatory against out-of-state fuel producers,
54. Former Chair ARB Board Chair Persons, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) available at
http://arb.ca.gov/board/priorchairs.htin.
55. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, EPA At Heln's Deep: Surviving the
Fourth Attack on Environmental La4, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205 (2013)
(noting that the EPA has undergone numerous assaults since the Reagan
Administration).
56. For a description of the lawsuit and its procedural history, see Sean Hecht,
California Court of Appeal U/pholds AB 32 Scoping Plan for Greenhouse Gas
Reduction, LEGAL PLANET, (June 19, 2010), available at
legalplanet.wordpress.com/2012/06/19/california-court-of-appeal-upholds-ab-32-
scoping-plan-for-greenhouse-gas-reduction/
57. See Chris Clarke, State's Cap and Trade Program Survives Court
Challenge, KCET REWIRE, (Feb 29, 2013), available at
http://vww.kcet.orgnews/rewire/climate-change/states-cap-and-trade-program-
survives-court-challenge.html (last visited March 17, 2013).
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has to date succeeded and remains a large unknown in the success of
the state's program.5 8 Nevertheless, even if the program fails, the
state should meet its overall emissions target because the cap-and-
trade-program captures the same sectors subject to the LCSF but
allows them more flexibility in determining their compliance options.
Thus even if not required to meet the LCFS, fuel distributers will
face limits on their emissions under the cap-and-trade program.
Finally, a fourth legal challenge, alleging that the cap-and-trade
auction CARB has adopted is an illegal tax under the California
constitution, has yet to be heard. 59 Though the state may not succeed
in turning back every legal challenge, CARB appears to have been
very careful in its program design and has managed to remain on
schedule even in the face of legal challenge.
II. CARB AND REGULATORY CAPACITY
My point in recounting CARB's experience in implementing AB
32 is not that the choices CARB has made are perfect, or even the
best choices they could have made. I mean simply to demonstrate
that their technical and political success in implementing a program
of extraordinary complexity has required significant agency
competence that is a necessary underpinning of California's climate
leadership.60 Put a different way, my claim is that California could
not have implemented such wide-ranging climate policy without the
extraordinary regulatory capacity it has developed over the past
several decades.
Indeed it is not at all clear the California legislature would have
passed AB 32 without the confidence that its lead agency on the
58. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union V. Goldstene,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/76767308/Rocky-Mountain-Farmers-Union-v-
Goldstene-2-EDCA-09-2234 I (last visited March 17., 2013).
59. California Chamber of Commerce v. California Air Resources Board,
http://www.calchamber.com/GovernmentRelations/Documents/FILED MPA 11-
13-1 2.pdf (last visited March 17., 2013).
60. See generally, Robin Kundis Craig., Learning To Think About Complex
Environmental Systems in Environmental and Natural Resource Law and Legal
Scholarship: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 89
(2013) (arguing that environmental and natural resources law have long treated
environmental resources such as public land and landscapes., as capable of being
managed for individual components despite the fact that they are part of complex
systems).
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legislation possesses such extraordinary capacity. One of the most
influential environmental legislators in the state, Senator Fran Pavley
(author of AB 1493, California's mobile source greenhouse gas
legislation), was a member of the Assembly at the time of AB 32's
passage and a leading co-author of the bill.6' Pavley has expressed
certainty that the bill might never have passed had it contained a
detailed plan for reducing emissions. She also believes that the
Legislature's confidence in the competence of CARB is what made
passage possible. 62 It seems hard to imagine that the Legislature
would have vested power in CARB to devise an economy-wide
program that will regulate virtually all aspects of the state's economy
unless it had tremendous confidence in CARB's regulatory capacity.
And whether or not the sophistication of CARB is what led to the
bill's success, it seems uncontroversial to say that its regulatory
capacity has made possible the on-time implementation of an
extraordinarily ambitious program to reduce greenhouse gases.
What is less clear is exactly how the state has built such
sophisticated capacity. I offer several preliminary suggestions that
merit further exploration in future work.
A. Budget Protection
CARB's budget structure plays an important role in its regulatory
success. Between the time AB 32 passed in 2006 and the
implementation of the cap-and-trade program CARB adopted as part
of its delegated authority, California experienced one of the worst
budget crises in its history. Each of the fiscal years beginning in 2009
required the closing of massive budget deficits in the tens of billions
of dollars. The state made huge spending cuts to virtually every
program in the state, from education to the judiciary. CARB,
61. See Califbornia Lawmakers Adopt Tough Climate Rules, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO (aired August 31, 2006), transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/storv.php?storvld=5744849.
62. Conversation between Senator Fran Pavlev and author, September 11, 2011.
confirmed in email between Senator Pavley and author, January 15, 2013 (on file
with author).
63. California Budget Crisis, NEW YORK TIMES (updated January 11, 2013),
available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandpossessions/cal
ifornia/budget crisis 2008 09/index.html.
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however, was largely (though not completely) immune from the
budgetary crisis facing other state programs.
From 2007-08, prior to the recession, to 2012-13, CARB's staffing
went from 1151.8 positions to 1273.2 positions, with no decline in
between. 64 Much of the increase was from the new program to
implement AB 32 but the agency's other programs also held their
own. That's because the agency receives the vast majority of its
funding from fees raised from regulated parties. These funds include
the Air Pollution Control Fund, the Vehicle Inspection and Repair
Fund, and the California Ports Infrastructure, Security and Air
Quality Improvement Account. 65 And, importantly, as of July 2010,
CARB established - based on statutory authorization contained in
AB 32 - the AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee Regulation. The new
regulation imposed fees on approximately 300 large greenhouse gas
emitters, including natural gas distributors, cement manufacturers
and electricity generators, among others. The fee funds all of
CARB's program administrative needs. Additionally, prior to the
implementation of the fee, CARB was allowed to borrow program
start-up funds, funds it is now paying back with the AB 32 fees. 66
CARB's revenue stream benefits the agency in a number of ways.
It allows agency leaders to plan the implementation of programs
going forward with the assurance that funds will be available to hire
necessary staff. Because CARB sets the fees based on its own
anticipated program needs it can set the fees at the amount necessary
to cover what the agency actually needs for implementation. And
64. See 3900 Air Resources Board: 3-Yr Expenditures & Positions,
GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 2009-10: PROPOSED BUDGET DETAIL (last visited Feb. 11,
2013), available at http://2009-
10.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/StateAgencyBudgets/3890/3900/spr.htil; 3900 Air
Resources Board: 3-Yr Expenditures & Position, GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 2013-14:
PROPOSED BUDGET DETAIL, (last visited Feb. 11, 2013)
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/StateAgencvBudgets/3890/3900/spr.htinl.
65. See Environmental Protection: 3900 Air Resources Board, GOVERNOR'S




66. See AB 32 Cost of Implementation Fee Regulation, CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: AIR RESOURCES BOARD (last visited Oct.
13, 2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/adminfee/ab32coifactsheet.pdf;
Cal. Code. Regs. Tit. 17, § 95200 (2012), et seq.
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guaranteed revenue streams also insulate CARB from the types of
political pressures other agencies - most notably the federal
Environmental Protection Agency - routinely face in the budget
process. EPA's efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, for
example, have routinely faced drastic budget cuts by House
Republicans, though to date those efforts have not succeeded.67
CARB's record of on-time implementation of extraordinarily
complex regulatory programs is due in no small part to the fact that
the agency has the staff necessary to carry out its responsibilities.
This is a luxury not afforded to government programs that lack their
own protected revenue source.
B. CARB's Organizational Structure
CARB has two additional attributes that may contribute to its
regulatory competence. First, it has a board appointed by the
Governor with Senate approval that includes representatives from the
state's four largest air districts and requires representation by experts
in automotive engineering, the health effects of air pollution and
either law, science or agriculture. The board members serve part
time, except for the chair, who is drawn from the board's
membership and serves full time.68 This combination of expertise
combined with political accountability may work particularly
effectively in providing leadership that is both expert and politically
sensitive. Second, the agency has a staff that is highly professional
and well-paid. The staff includes very technically competent
engineers, sophisticated lawyers, and high level policy experts, who
command salaries that can exceed $115,000 annually, combined with
generous health and pension benefits. 69 The professional expertise
and compensation seems obviously key to attracting and keeping
67. Evan Lehman, House Republicans Open a Major Budget Battle, Proposing
Deep Cuts into Energy, Environment, Climate Spending., N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 14,
2011) available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/02/14/14climatewire-
house-republicans-open-a-major-budget-battle-61602.html?pagewanted all.
68. See About the Selection of our Board, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: AIR RESOURCES BOARD (last visited March 17, 2013),
available at http://vww.arb.ca.gov/board/about.htin.
69. See Classifications and Salaries, CALIFORNIA ENTIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: AIR RESOURCES BOARD (last visited Nov. 30., 2012),
available at www.arb.ca.gov/personnel/transactions/clspay3.htm.
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highly competent staff, a necessity for the development of a
regulatory scheme as wide-ranging at AB 32.
While independent budget lines and a well-staffed agency are
important conditions for regulatory success, they do not by any
means guarantee that an agency will pursue strong and well-crafted
environmental policy.
C. Success Begets Success
California's early and ongoing successes in regulating air pollution
- with demonstrable results - provide an obvious metric for
observers, including elected officials, to have faith in the agency.
This faith can, in turn, translate into protection from significant
budget cuts and willingness to delegate broad authority to the agency.
And the positive reputation of the agency has a number of additional
benefits, including the ability to attract top-notch staff and receive
some political protection during pitched battles with regulated parties
and other interested communities over regulatory approaches.
The successes CARB has achieved in reducing air pollution are too
lengthy to describe in detail here. But several examples help illustrate
the point. CARB's principle jurisdiction in regulating air pollutants is
over mobile sources (local air districts have principle responsibility
for stationary sources). Since 1970, the state has cut nitrous oxide
emissions from cars by more than 99 percent.70 More generally, a
2003 quote from then-CARB Chairman Alan Lloyd describes the
success of California's Low Emissions Vehicle regulations as
follows:
[W]e've seen the near impossible accomplished with
gasoline vehicles: zero evaporative emissions, exceedingly
clean exhaust-cleaner, in some cases, than the outside air
entering the cabin for ventilation purposes, and emission
control systems that are twice as durable [as] their
70. The first nitrogen oxide standard was 4.0 grams per mile; for super-low-
emissions vehicles in the state the standard is .02 grams per mile. See CLEAN AIR
COUNCIL, Low EMissioNS VEHICLES: COMPARING THE FUTURE OF VEHICLE
EMISSION STANDARDS: LEV. I V. TIER 2, at 3 (n.d.), available at
http://www.cleanair.org/Transportation/cleanCars/lev2.pdf.
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conventional forbearers, forecasted to last an astonishing
150,000 miles.'
The decline in automobile emissions, combined with stationary
source regulation, has led to rather remarkable achievements in
overall air quality. In the South Coast basin, for example, which leads
the country in air pollution, the decline in the number of days in
violation of the federal one-hour ozone standard is staggering.
Between 1973 and 1980, the basin violated the standard 644 times
between 2003 and 2011 - by contrast the district violated the
standard a total of 2 times in 8 years.72
These successes are real and visible to political leaders and their
constituents. The sky is bluer and the air easier to breathe. The
exhaust from tailpipes from new cars is invisible, not black. Given
these successes, it is not surprising that Californians care about
environmental issues and that politicians respond to voter preferences
by continuing to lead on the environment.
On the climate change front, given the state's long history in
regulating mobile sources, it is also not surprising that the state's first
major foray into regulating greenhouse gases was to grant CARB
broad authority to regulate emissions from cars.n Despite intense
legal and political battles over whether the state had the legal
authority to issue such standards, when President Obama was elected
president he used the state's standards to negotiate with the auto
manufacturers and extend the standards to the rest of the country.74
Again, success appears to have begotten more success for the agency,
lending it credibility and continued support from political leaders.
The success of AB 1493 gave the Legislature confidence to entrust
the much broader AB 32 to the agency. As Senator Pavley, who
authored AB 1493, said about AB 32's passage: "CARB had done a
great job with AB 1493... And since auto emissions are the most
71. ARB Modifies Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Regulation, CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
(Press Release, Apr. 24, 2003), available at
http://vww.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr042403.htm.
72. Ozone Trends Summary: South Central Coast Air Basin, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD (last visited Feb. 11, 2013),
http://vww.arb.ca.gov/adam/trends/trends2.php
73. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2012).
74. For a description of the extension of the California standards to the federal
fleet, see Carison (Iterative Federalism), supra note 5., at 1127-28.
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significant contributor to GHG emissions in the state, they could use
their proven expertise on mobile sources and expand to stationary
sources too."75
In short, CARB's success in reducing air pollution and its long
experience regulating automobile emissions led the legislature to
entrust it with the power to develop the country's first greenhouse
gas emissions standards for cars. When CARB accomplished that
task with such success, the legislature had the faith to delegate vast
amounts of regulatory power to the agency to implement an
economy-wide climate program. CARB's history, in other words, led
to its future.
D. Avoiding Agency Capture
A final observation about CARB's regulatory capacity is worth
noting. Despite the fact that, until the passage of AB 32, the principal
industry subject to CARB's regulatory agenda was the auto industry,
the agency appears to have avoided being dominated by its regulatory
object. Instead CARB has continued to regulate the industry
aggressively, virtually always over strenuous objections that auto
manufacturers are being subject to overly burdensome regulations
that will cost the industry vastlv more than CARB estimates.
CARB's avoidance of agency capture belies conventional accounts
of agency behavior that suggest that regulated parties tend to unduly
influence the information and agenda of the agency that regulates
them. 6 What, then, accounts for CARB's independence?
At least one factor is that the state has no indigenous auto industry.
Indeed some observers contend that CARB regulates auto emissions
particularly strongly because it can externalize the costs of its
regulations on out-of-state parties,7 though independent analyses
suggest that the costs of the state's auto regulations are in fact borne
75. Email from Fran Pavley to author, January 14., 2013. on file with author.
76. Canonical texts about agency capture include Samuel Huntington. The
Marasmus of the ICC, 61 YALE L. J. 467 (1952) and George Stigler, The Theory of
Economics Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECoN. 3 (1971) ("A central thesis of this paper is
that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit.") For an excellent summary of the literature, see Nicholas
Bagley and Richard Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM L. REV. 1260, 1285-86 (2006).
77. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can
Improve the -National Legislative Process., 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23, n. 74 (2007).
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by Californians.78 At a minimum, though, it seems implausible to
envision that CARB would have regulated emissions so vigorously if
thousands of members of the United Auto Workers and high-level
auto industry executives were in-state constituents of state legislators.
Two other factors, highlighted above, also seem to contribute to
the agency's independence. The composition of the board
membership, with experts from several professions along with local
elected officials, helps insulate CARB from direct political influence.
And the highly professional, competent and well-compensated staff -
working at one of the world's greatly respected enviromnental
agencies - provides a bulwark against an industry that could
otherwise attempt to control technical information and expertise in
influencing the agency.
The state's long history of regulating auto emissions has also led to
the development of an in-state industry that develops technology to
foster compliance with California's tough regulatory standards. The
presence of this industry helps counter arguments that CARB is bad
for business in the state: to the contrary, the regulatory environment
has helped create green jobs, an argument that has in turn been used
extensively in support of California's climate legislation. 79 Indeed
green businesses helped thwart Proposition 23 on the 2010 ballot, the
initiative that would have halted AB 32's implementation.
Finally, the auto industry has from the beginning of California's
efforts to regulate auto emissions behaved in ways that have
diminished its credibility in state. At the outset of the state's efforts
to regulate car emissions, the industry simply denied any connection
between Southern California smog and car emissions despite strong
evidence to the contrary.o8 The car manufacturers so badly
overplayed this argument that the Legislature, in passing the first
auto standards, simply stopped believing the industry altogether.
78. See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM To
IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21-22 (1996).
79. See Todd Woody., Texas Oil v. California Clean Tech: The Battle Over
Proposition 23, Grist, (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://grist.orgarticle/2010-08-
17-texas-oil-v-california-clean-tech-the-battle-over-prop-23/full/
80. See JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSTN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE
ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR
POLLUTION 1940-1975, at 185 (1977).
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This pattern has repeated itself on numerous occasions, making it
easier for CARB to operate independently.
CONCLUSION
Many factors contribute to state environmental leadership, a
number of which have received significant scholarly attention. My
aim here is to suggest that a state's regulatory capacity is one
previously overlooked explanation for why a state may emerge as an
environmental leader in a particular substantive area. I also aim to
begin a conversation about what leads to successful regulatory
capacity, focusing here on agency structure, revenue sources and
history as potentially important variables. If my suggestions are
correct, they may help predict the trajectory of state environmental
leadership 20 years hence, for the fortieth anniversary issue of the
Fordham Environmental Law Review.
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